Quality change in the CPI - commentary by Robert J. Gordon
 
1  Hulten’s own discussion of
“New Goods” recognizes that
the repackaging assumption is
of no use when one attempts
to measure the value of totally
new goods, such as the inven-
tion of television or of the VCR.
 









harles Hulten’s original and chal-
lenging article reaches two original
conclusions and stresses a third
conclusion based on the work of others.
First, he introduces a new and unconven-
tional approach to the theory of quality
change, based on his new parameter 
 
m,
deﬁned as the elasticity of the marginal
cost of producing a good with respect to
an improvement in its quality.  He
concludes that this “neglected cost dimen-
sion” may contribute a signiﬁcant upward
bias to the CPI in general, and his
interpretation implies that the hedonic
regression technique is fundamentally
ﬂawed as a tool of quality adjustment.
Second, and unrelated to the ﬁrst point, he
argues that the link method presently used
to adjust the CPI for quality change may
create a downward bias in the CPI large
enough to “dominate the quality-cost
bias.”  A third point, but one that is not
original to this paper, is that the CPI
currently embodies a large adjustment for
quality.
Hulten’s ﬁrst and second con-
clusions—that there are major sources of
both upward and downward bias in the
CPI and that these biases were ignored by
the Boskin Commission—deserve careful
consideration because they could be
important.  In these comments, however, I
shall conclude that, to the contrary, the
sources of bias he discusses are not new;
they are already incorporated into the esti-
mates presented in the Commission’s
report.
Let me defer the quantiﬁcation of CPI
bias in order to focus ﬁrst on Hulten’s the-
oretical contribution.  When closely
examined, Hulten’s “m factor” does not
turn out to represent a novel contribution;
rather, it is a rediscovery that the elasticity
of marginal costs of quality characteristics,
as measured directly by cost comparisons
or indirectly in hedonic regressions, does
not have to equal unity.  An elasticity of
unity has never received any special atten-
tion in the literature on the hedonic
regression model, and for a very good
reason:  It has no theoretical importance,
nor is there any empirical reason for an
elasticity of unity to be a standard
empirical result.  Thus, Hulten’s theoretical
framework does not contribute a new
source of bias in the CPI for quality adjust-
ments based on the hedonic or
direct-cost-comparison methods.
CAN THE COST ELASTICITY
DIFFER FROM UNITY?
Hulten follows Triplett in treating
quality differences between different
models of the same good as embodying dif-
ferent quantities of what he calls “efﬁciency
units” and what Triplett calls “characteris-
tics.”  In this view, a good, 
 
Y, containing
(1+q) as many characteristics—e.g., com-
puter MIPS—as another good, X, can be
added together with units of X.  As Hulten
states, “this approach amounts to con-
verting differences in the quality of goods
into an equivalent difference in quantity.”  I
prefer to refer to X and Y not as “goods” but
rather as “models” of the same good—e.g.,
automobiles or computers.  The “repack-
aging” assumption required to make direct
comparisons between X and Y is more
plausible for models of the same good than
for different goods (e.g., houses and med-
ical insurance) that embody totally
different dimensions of characteristics.1
There are two problems with Hulten’s
analysis.  First, he does not distinguish
between the slope of the supply curve of
characteristics and shifts in that curve
made possible by technological change.
Second, he does not interpret correctly the
implication of a cost elasticity of less than
unity.  Let us consider ﬁrst a world of con-
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the typical computer—e.g.,
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stant technology, in which a variety of
products and a variety of models of each
product are produced.  Quality differences
among these models are costly to produce.
A large refrigerator costs more than a small
one, and a 200 MHZ computer chip costs
more than a 100 MHZ chip.  In every type
of commodity, from string beans to hous-
ing to automobiles to health insurance, we
ﬁnd many different varieties of the same
good coexisting in the marketplace.
The appropriate framework for
analysis is a simple diagram of supply and
demand, in which the nominal price of a
characteristic (or efﬁciency unit) is plotted
on the vertical axis and the number of
characteristics is plotted on the horizontal
axis.  The supply curve of characteristics is
upward sloping, with a slope that expres-
ses the marginal cost of producing models
containing additional characteristics.  The
hedonic regression approach is one method
to estimate the slope of the supply curve of
characteristics; the BLS method of estim-
ating production costs directly is a second
method of estimating the slope.  There is
no expectation that the elasticity of this
slope would be unity—i.e., that model Y,
containing double the number of char-
acteristics as model X, would cost twice as
much.  For instance, a computer operating
at a speed of 200 MHZ might cost 50 per-
cent rather than 100 percent more than





Thus far I agree with Hulten that his
m coefficient, the elasticity of cost to
changes in the quantity of characteristics,
can differ from unity.  At that point, how-
ever, Hulten diverges from the standard
interpretation of the hedonic regression
model.  To be concrete, let us assume that
there are two models on the market and
that the second model, Y, incorporates
(1+q) times as many characteristics as the
first model, X.  We adopt Hulten’s own
numerical example, q = 0.1, and we
assume that m = 0.5, so that model Y costs
(1+mq) or 1.05 as much as model X.
How can the two models exist on the
market at the same time?  The larger
model, Y, offers the characteristic in ques-
tion at a price of (1+mq) / (1+q) or
1.05/1.10 = 0.95 times the price per char-
acteristic of model X.
Here is where Hulten goes astray.  He
states, “The result is that the old good, X,
is cost-ineffective and therefore disappears
from the market.”  When a 100 MHZ com-
puter costs $1,000 and coexists on the
market with a 200 MHZ computer costing
$1,500, then the smaller model offers a
price per MHZ of $10, while the larger
model offers MHZ at a lower price of
$7.50.  If each unit of MHZ yielded the
same marginal utility, then the smaller,
more expensive, model would be driven
from the market by the larger model,
according to the “law of one price.”
Yet Hulten does not recognize a basic
aspect of markets in the real world: that
different models of the same good, with
different sizes and different prices per unit
(e.g., price per MHZ of computers or price
per ounce of dishwasher detergent or corn
ﬂakes), can and do exist on the market at
the same time.  Therefore, it must be true
that the elasticity of utility to the quantity
of characteristics is less than unity when
the cost elasticity, m, is less than unity.
In fact, this was the point of Rosen’s
famous 1974 article (which Hulten neither
cites nor discusses) on the theory of the
hedonic regression model—that the price-
characteristic surface traced out by the
hedonic function represents a series of tan-
gency points between cost curves and
indifference curves.  Some purchasers
forego the chance to buy the larger
computer, despite the lower $7.50 price
per MHZ, because for them the marginal
utility schedule for units of MHZ declines
even faster than the price.  Another reason
that packaged goods such as detergent can
coexist on the market in different size
packages at different prices per ounce is
that the choice of a detergent is based on a
number of factors: the detergent itself, the
energy involved in carrying it home, the
storage space needed, and the strengthFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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required to pick up the bottle and pour the
detergent into the washing machine.  So
some people may face these tradeoffs and
choose the smaller bottle even though it is
more expensive per ounce.
This brings us to Hulten’s Equation 1,
intended to assess the accuracy of different
methods of quality adjustment.  In
Hulten’s formulation, the observed differ-
ence in price between one period and the
next—when one model, Y(t), replaces
another model, X(t–1), consists of the
product of three terms: the ratio of differ-
ences in the quantity of characteristics,
(1+q), times the ratio of the difference in
cost to the difference in characteristics
(1+mq) / (1+q), times the “pure price
change” between the two periods (1+r).
Taking logs and designating the observed
log price change between X(t-1) and Y(t)
as a we have an alternative and simpliﬁed
version of the relationship:
(1) a = mq + r. 
Contrary to Hulten’s assertion, the
overlap, hedonic, and direct cost methods
all provide the correct answer: that the dif-
ference in utility yielded by the two mod-
els is mq and is measured by their price
differential on the market, which in turn is
equal to their cost differential.  To the con-
trary, Hulten claims that q rather than mq,
must be the correct answer when two
models with different implicit prices of
characteristics coexist on the market (that
more than a single model exists at a given
time is, of course, a necessary condition
for a hedonic regression to be estimated).
We know in the real world that many
models of a given product coexist, but also
that models disappear.  This occurs not
because m is less than unity, but because
the supply curve shifts when new tech-
nology is introduced.  The whole menu of
choices between small and large models of,
say, computers shifts in a favorable direc-
tion, with a decline in the price per
characteristic of small and large models
alike.  With the new technology, m may
still be unchanged at a number like 0.5,
the old menu of models is obsolete and
disappears from the market, and small
models incorporating the new technology
coexist with large models once again.
MEASURING THE PURE
PRICE CHANGE
Returning to our supply-demand dia-
gram, until now we have suggested no
reason for the supply curve to shift, but of
course it can shift up or down, as it must if
we are to register any pure price change
(r) other than zero.  Pure macroeconomic
inﬂation would shift the supply curve up,
and the technological change that has been
typical in most electronics products,
including computers and cellular phones,
would shift the curve down.  The hedonic
regression technique is designed, of
course, to disentangle shifts in the supply
curve (pure price change) from movements
along a single supply curve (changes in the
quantity of characteristics in a particular
good that alter both its utility and its cost).
Consider a shift in the supply curve in
a diagram which plots the nominal price of
a characteristic against the quantity of
characteristics.  There is a single unshif-
ting downward-sloping demand curve.
The supply curve shifts down because of
technological change, and a new market
equilibrium occurs at a lower price and
larger quantity of characteristics, but the
observed decline in price is not the pure
change in price.  By allowing us to estimate
the slope of the supply curve, the hedonic
technique enables us to add to the observed
price decline the extra component of price
decline attributable to the new technology.
Consider an example of a typical model, in
which we observe a new equilibrium
involving a 10 percent price reduction, a
20 percent increase in the quantity of char-
acteristics, and a supply curve slope (m)
once again at 0.5.  We can use Equation 1
above to extract the pure price decline:
(2)  r = a – mq = –0.10 – (0.5)0.2  = – 0.20.
Hulten fails to recognize that the coex-
istence of models under these circum-
stances can occur only if there is a
diminishing marginal utility of characteris-tics for different potential purchasers (or if
there is a joint product aspect, as in the
above example of differently sized packages
of detergent) and that models disappear not
because the cost elasticity m is less than
unity, but because technological change can
shift the supply curve of characteristics.
Although Hulten cites my treatment of
this topic (Gordon, 1990, Chapter 2) as
the source of the distinction between “pro-
portional” and “nonproportional” quality
change, I used those terms differently to
distinguish, respectively, changes in
quality caused by movements along the
supply curve and shifts in the supply
curve.  In contrast, Hulten uses the word
“proportional” to designate a m elasticity of
unity and “nonproportional” to designate
m less than unity, while he never considers
the effects of a shift in the supply curve
and cannot ﬁt it into his framework as it
stands.  His example of “costless” quality
change is a m value of zero, whereas for me
it is a downward shift in the supply curve
that allows more characteristics to be pro-
duced at an unchanged price per
characteristic.
HULTEN’S INTERPRETATION
OF THE CPI BIAS
Hulten is wrong that “all methods
used to construct CPI implicitly assume
that m is equal to one.”  By “all methods”
he refers to the overlap, hedonic, and cost-
comparison methods.  But there is no
special role of m = 1 in the hedonic regres-
sion model.  Hulten states in his review of
BLS methods that price hedonics provide
an estimate of q, whereas in fact the
hedonic coefﬁcients provide estimates of
mq.  The elasticity of cost and price to
changes in the quantity of the characteris-
tics entering into the hedonic regression
equation is not unity; it is whatever it is,
and there are plenty of examples in which
this elasticity is below unity.  Because
existing methods are based on estimating
the slope of a supply curve for a good
when different-size models coexist, there is
no bias in these methods.  Thus Hulten’s
conjectural estimates of a major upward
bias in the CPI due to a basic ﬂaw in these
methods are groundless, and we are back
to the product-by-product examination
recently debated by the Boskin
Commission and its critics.
Hulten’s second main point is that the
BLS linking method creates a major down-
ward bias in the CPI.  This assertion is not
based on any solid evidence but rather on
a circumstantial “suspicion” growing out
of the fact that the link method attributed
virtually all of raw price changes to quality
improvements in 1995.  He computes a
“link” bias by reducing the fraction of raw
price change attributed to quality change
in the link method (near unity) to the
much lower fraction of 37 percent
attributed to quality change by the direct
quality adjustment method.
The much lower fraction of raw price
change attributed to quality change in the
direct quality adjustment method may
reﬂect, as Hulten admits, “inherent quality
differentials in the items handled with the
various methods.”   Yet he proceeds to
ignore this possibility by attributing the
lower quality attribution to the link
method, emerging with huge estimates of
the downward bias.
There are two important reasons to
disregard Hulten’s “link bias” estimates.
First, the evidence provided in the ﬁnal
version of the Moulton-Moses (1997)
paper is that truncation of items with
quality increases larger than 100 percent or
decreases larger than 50 percent reduces
the overall CPI correction for quality
change from 1.65 to 0.30 percent.
Obviously, most of the quality correction
in the CPI is for items that are very
different sizes, not what we mean by
“quality” in the Boskin Commission or in
other discussions of quality change.
Just as important, we have plenty of
outside, independent evidence on the
importance of any “link” bias.  Because it
collects prices monthly, the CPI is much
more likely to allow items that may be
temporarily out of stock to disappear, with
the resulting need to link, than are alterna-
tive research results based on yearly or
half-decadal comparisons of price and
quality change.  In my study of durable
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and Consumer Reports, only a small
fraction of models of the typical product
needed to be replaced from year to year,
and there was no tendency for price
changes to be concentrated only on new
models rather than continuing models.
Alternative studies of price and quality
change, based entirely on information
independent of CPI data sources, are con-
sistent in ﬁnding an upward bias in the
CPI, especially for appliances, radio, TV ,
computers, apparel (since 1985), drugs,
and medical care.  This result suggests that
the linking bias cannot be major.
Hulten’s third conclusion (listed ﬁrst
in his concluding section) is that the CPI
“currently embodies a large adjustment for
quality.”  This simply repeats the results of
Moulton and Moses, but as they show,
“large” becomes “small” (0.3 percent per
year) when price increases of more than
double or price decreases of more than half
are deleted from the sample.  These large
changes, presumably due mainly to
changes in package size, do not represent
adjustments for quality change in the
sense that most economists use that term.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, none of Hulten’s three
conclusions is valid, and none requires a
reconsideration of the conclusions of the
Boskin commission.  The “neglected cost
dimension” is not a neglected dimension
at all, for it is Hulten who fails to consider
why models with different prices per unit
of characteristic coexist on the market,
and it is he who fails to consider the
distinction between movements along the
supply curve and shifts in the supply
curve.  The “link bias” is not a bias at all,
but rather a corollary of the fact that most
of the quality adjustments in the CPI are
made for differences in package size rather
than actual differences in quality.  And the
conclusion that the CPI already makes
large quality adjustments turns out to be
untrue when large price differentials
reﬂecting changing package size are
discarded.
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Robert Gordon has made many contri-
butions to the ﬁeld of price measurement.
In the process, he has developed a partic-
ular way of looking at the problem.
Unfortunately, he has tried to impose his
framework on mine.  The resulting
criticisms of my article are essentially an
attempt to pound my square pegs into his
round holes.
Take, for example, Gordon’s compar-
ison of a 100 megahertz (MHZ) computer
that costs $1,000 with a 200 MHZ model
costing $1,500.  He correctly concludes
that both models may coexist in the
market even though the 100 MHZ model
delivers less computing power per dollar
than its 200 MHZ competitor ($10 per
MHZ versus $7.50 per MHZ).  Gordon
incorrectly believes that this example
shows that my formulation, based on the
cost-elasticity m, is wrong:  He believes
that I do not recognize that different
models of the same good coexist, without
disappearing, even though they are simul-
taneously on sale at different prices per
characteristic.
The problem with this criticism lies in
Gordon’s focus on price per characteristic.
My model does not make use of this con-
cept.  Instead, I use the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between goods of dif-
ferent qualities and, while the MRS is
related to the characteristics of the
different goods, it is far from the same
thing.  Gordon’s problem is resolved in my
framework by recognizing that the MRS
between his two models is not necessarily
equal to 200/100, even though this is the
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Hulten’s Reply to Gordonratio of the MHZ characteristic.  Indeed,
the MRS between the 100 MHZ and 200
MHZ models may well be 1.5 despite the
greater difference in MHZ.  In this case,
the MRS is just equal to the ratio of
marginal costs (or marginal rate of
transformation) and both models survive
in the market “at different prices per char-
acteristic” as Gordon’s example requires.
On the other hand, if the MRS between the
two models happens to be greater than 1.5,
the 100 MHZ model would disappear
because it is not cost effective.  The impor-
tance of such corner solutions for the
new-goods problem was recognized as
early as Hicks (1940).
I also plead “not guilty” to the charge
that I confuse shifts in the supply and
movements along the supply curve.  I
assume that each model of a good is
produced at a constant marginal cost and
that quality improvements shift the cost
function by the factor mq.  Gordon’s confu-
sion arises, again, from his orientation to
the characteristics of goods rather than to
the goods themselves.  There may, of
course, be instances where the marginal
cost of goods is rising, not constant as I
assume.  The parameter is not necessarily
constant in this case, and competition
among producers may cause it to rise to
the point where it equals one (though this
is not necessarily the only outcome).  I
allude to this possibility on pages 85-86 of
my article.  But surely no one would argue
that the parameter m is always equal to
one, since this would mean that old
varieties of goods never become obsolete.
Once it is admitted that m can be less
than one, it must also be admitted that the
CPI may be biased on this account.  This
possibility is most apparent in the “cost of
production” method used by BLS to
handle quality change.  In this procedure,
producers are asked to estimate the direct
production cost involved in bringing a
new model to market.  The change in cost
is entirely attributed to quality change.
This involves no bias if costs rise in exact
proportion to (my deﬁnition of) quality—
i.e., when m is equal to one.  However,
when m is less than one, quality rises more
rapidly than costs and the BLS procedure
understates this true increase.  I believe
that the other BLS procedures for handling
quality change are also subject to a m-bias,
for the reasons given in the paper.
Gordon also challenges my contention
that there might be a “link bias” operating
in the opposite direction of the m-bias.  He
states at the end of his comments that
“The ‘link bias’ is not a bias at all . . .”
This is surely too strong.  Manufacturers
sometimes wait until the introduction of a
new model to introduce a planned price
increase, and this delay in repricing gets
attributed to “quality” by the link method.
Gordon disputes this possibility, but the
quote by Reinsdorf, Liegey, and Stewart
(1996) cited in the text of my article sug-
gests that the issue is a not a settled
matter.  This point is seconded by Triplett
(1997), who has long been convinced that
the link method over-adjusts for quality
change.  Gordon himself seems to suggest
that there might be as much as a 0.30 per-
cent bias, the residual left over after the
Moulton-Moses truncation procedure.
While I have reservations about the
arbitrary truncation of the price data by
Moulton and Moses (truncation is neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient to identify “true”
quality change), the 0.30 percent estimate
is not so very different from my “guess-
timate” of 0.485 percent presented on page 94.
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